

First-Order Logic

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Propositional possible worlds

Each possible world is a structure $\langle \{0,1\}, \mathbf{P}, \nu \rangle$

$\{0,1\}$ are the *truth values*

\mathbf{P} is the **signature** of the formal language: a set of propositional symbols

ν is a *function*: $\mathbf{P} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ assigning truth values to the symbols in \mathbf{P}

Propositional symbols (*signature*)

Each symbol in \mathbf{P} stands for an actual *proposition* (in natural language)

In the simple convention, we use the symbols A, B, C, D, \dots

Caution: \mathbf{P} is not necessarily *finite*

Possible worlds

The class of structures contains all possible worlds:

$\langle \{0,1\}, \mathbf{P}, \nu \rangle$

$\langle \{0,1\}, \mathbf{P}, \nu' \rangle$

$\langle \{0,1\}, \mathbf{P}, \nu'' \rangle$

...

Each class of structure shares \mathbf{P} and $\{0,1\}$

The functions ν are different: the assignment of truth values varies, depending on the possible world

If \mathbf{P} is finite, there are only *finitely* many distinct possible worlds (actually $2^{|\mathbf{P}|}$)

First-order possible worlds

Possible worlds made of objects, functions and relations

Each possible world is a structure $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$

\mathbf{U} is a set of object, called **domain** (also *universe of discourse*)

Σ is a set of symbols, called **signature**

ν is a *function* that gives a *meaning* to the symbol in Σ with respect to \mathbf{U}

Signature Σ

- *individual constants*: a, b, c, d, \dots
- *function symbols (with arity)*: $f/n, g/p, h/q, \dots$
- *predicate symbols (with arity)*: $P/k, Q/l, R/m, \dots$

*Arity is an integer number
that describes the expected number
of arguments*

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Term

A single *individual constant* is a **term**

If f/n is a *functional symbol* (with arity n) and t_1, \dots, t_n are **terms**, then $f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ is a **term**

Atom

If P/n is a *predicate symbol* (with arity n) and t_1, \dots, t_n are **terms**, then $P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ is an **atom** (i.e a first-order well-formed formula – wff)

First-order possible worlds

Possible worlds made of objects, functions and relations

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Function ν (***interpretation***)

- ν assigns each *individual constant* to an *object* in \mathbf{U}
 $\nu(a) \in \mathbf{U}$ (a individual constant)
- ν assigns each *functional symbol* a *function* defined on \mathbf{U}
 $\nu(f/n) : \mathbf{U}^n \rightarrow \mathbf{U}$ (f/n functional symbol)
- ν assigns each *predicate symbol* a *relation* defined on \mathbf{U}
 $\nu(P/m) \subseteq \mathbf{U}^m$ (P/n predicate symbol)

Say it with atoms

Example structure $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, v \rangle$

Domain \mathbf{U}


Objects: { *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, *green*, *orange*, *red*, *rose*, *violet* }

Signature Σ

Individual constants: *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, *green*, *orange*, *red*, *rose*, *violet*

Function symbols: *colorOf*/1

Predicate symbols: *Pyramid*/1, *Parallelepiped*/1, *Sphere*/1, *Ontable*/1, *Clear*/1, *Above*/2, *=*/2



Objects in \mathbf{U} are underlined
constant symbols in Σ are not

How does $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, v \rangle$ satisfy a set of atoms:

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, v \rangle \models$ *Pyramid*(*a*)
Parallelepiped(*b*), *Parallelepiped*(*c*), *Parallelepiped*(*e*)
Sphere(*d*)
Ontable(*c*), *Ontable*(*e*)
Clear(*a*), *Clear*(*d*)


$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, v \rangle \models$ (*colorOf*(*a*) = *green*), (*colorOf*(*b*) = *orange*), (*colorOf*(*c*) = *red*) , (*colorOf*(*d*) = *rose*)

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, v \rangle \models$ *Above*(*a*,*b*), *Above*(*b*,*c*), *Above*(*a*,*c*), *Above*(*d*,*e*)


Say it with atoms

Different possible worlds (only interpretation functions v change, in this example)


$\langle U, \Sigma, v_1 \rangle \models$ *Pyramid(a), Parallelepiped(b), Parallelepiped(c), Sphere(d), Parallelepiped(e),*
(colorOf(a) = green), (colorOf(b) = orange), (colorOf(c) = red),
(colorOf(d) = rose), (colorOf(e) = violet)
Ontable(c), Ontable(e), Clear(a), Clear(d)
Above(a,b), Above(b,c), Above(a,c), Above(d,e)



$\langle U, \Sigma, v_2 \rangle \models$ *Parallelepiped(a), Parallelepiped(b), Parallelepiped(c), Sphere(d), Pyramid(e),*
(colorOf(a) = red), (colorOf(b) = violet), (colorOf(c) = pink),
(colorOf(d) = green), (colorOf(e) = orange)
Ontable(a), Ontable(c), Ontable(e), Clear(a), , Clear(b), Clear(d)
Above(b,c), Above(d,e)



$\langle U, \Sigma, v_3 \rangle \models$ *Pyramid(a), Parallelepiped(b), Parallelepiped(c), Parallelepiped(e)*
Sphere(d)
(colorOf(a) = green), (colorOf(b) = orange), (colorOf(c) = red),
(colorOf(d) = rose), (colorOf(e) = violet)
Ontable(c), Ontable(e), Clear(a), Clear(d)
Above(a,b), Above(b,c), Above(a,c), Above(d,e)



Abstraction: variables and quantifiers

(just *intuitive semantics*, for now)

More general properties

$$\neg \forall x \exists y (Above(x,y))$$


$$\neg \forall y \exists x (Above(x,y))$$

Defining *new predicates*

$$\forall x \forall y (On(x,y) \leftrightarrow (Above(x,y) \wedge \neg \exists z (Above(x,z) \wedge Above(z,y))))$$

$$\forall x (Ontable(x) \leftrightarrow \neg \exists z Above(x,z))$$

$$\forall x (Clear(x) \leftrightarrow \neg \exists z Above(z,x))$$



Abstraction: variables and quantifiers

- “Being brothers means being relatives”

$$\forall x \forall y (Brother(x, y) \rightarrow Relative(x, y))$$

- “Being relative is a symmetric relation”

$$\forall x \forall y (Relative(x, y) \leftrightarrow Relative(y, x))$$

- “By definition, being mother is being parent and female”

$$\forall x (Mother(x) \leftrightarrow (\exists y Parent(x, y) \wedge Female(x)))$$

- “A cousin is a son of either a brother or a sister of either parents”

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x \forall y (Cousin(x, y) \\ \leftrightarrow \exists z \exists w (Parent(z, x) \wedge Parent(w, y) \wedge (Brother(z, w) \vee Sister(z, w)))) \end{aligned}$$

- “Everyone has a mother”

$$\forall x \exists y Mother(y, x)$$

BE CAREFUL about the order of quantifiers, in fact:

$$\exists y \forall x Mother(y, x)$$

“There is one (common) mother to everyone”

First-order language

■ Well-formed formulae (wff)

Starting from a *signature* Σ , add *variables* $x, y, z \dots$ and allow variables in *terms*:

A single *individual constant* or a *variable* is a **term**

If f/n is a *functional symbol* (with arity n) and t_1, \dots, t_n are **terms**, then $f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ is a **term**

The definition of *atoms* remains unchanged

Every *atom* composed from Σ and the variables is a $\text{wff}(L_{FO})$

$$\varphi \in \text{wff}(L_{FO}) \Rightarrow (\neg\varphi) \in \text{wff}(L_{FO})$$

$$\varphi, \psi \in \text{wff}(L_{FO}) \Rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \in \text{wff}(L_{FO})$$

$$\varphi \in \text{wff}(L_{FO}) \Rightarrow (\forall x \varphi) \in \text{wff}(L_{FO})$$

$$\varphi, \psi \in \text{wff}(L_{FO}), \quad (\varphi \vee \psi) \Leftrightarrow ((\neg\varphi) \rightarrow \psi)$$

$$\varphi, \psi \in \text{wff}(L_{FO}), \quad (\varphi \wedge \psi) \Leftrightarrow (\neg(\varphi \rightarrow (\neg\psi)))$$

$$\varphi, \psi \in \text{wff}(L_{FO}), \quad (\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) \Leftrightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\psi \rightarrow \varphi))$$

$$\varphi \in \text{wff}(L_{FO}) \quad (\exists x \varphi) \Leftrightarrow (\neg\forall x \neg\varphi)$$

Open formulae, sentences

- **Bound** and **free** variables

The occurrence of a *variable* in a wff is **bound** if it lies in the scope of a quantifier (for that *variable*)

The occurrence of a *variable* in a wff is **free** if it is not *bound*

Examples of bound variables:

$$\forall x P(x)$$

$$\exists x (P(x) \rightarrow (A(x) \wedge B(x)))$$

Examples of free variables:

$$P(x)$$

$$\exists y (P(y) \rightarrow (A(x,y) \wedge B(y)))$$

- **Open** and **closed** formulae

A wff is **open** if there is at least one free occurrence of a variable

Otherwise, the wff is **closed** (also called **sentence**)

Only *closed* wffs, i.e. *sentences*, have a truth value (see after)

Possible worlds, interpretations, valuation

- Possible world: a structure $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$

\mathbf{U} is a set of object, called **domain** (also *universe of discourse*)

Σ is a set of symbols, called **signature**

ν is a *function* that:

- ν assigns each *individual constant* to an *object* in \mathbf{U}

$\nu(a) \in \mathbf{U}$ (a individual constant)

- ν assigns each *functional symbol* a *function* defined on \mathbf{U}

$\nu(f/n) : \mathbf{U}^n \rightarrow \mathbf{U}$ (f/n functional symbol)

- ν assigns each *predicate symbol* a *relation* defined on \mathbf{U}

$\nu(P/m) \subseteq \mathbf{U}^m$ (P/n predicate symbol)

Function ν does not assign a value to variables

- Valuation (of variables): a function s

Given a possible world $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$, a **valuation** s

is a *function* that assigns at each **variable** x an **object** in \mathbf{U}

$s(x) \in \mathbf{U}$

Satisfaction

- Given a possible world $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$ and a valuation s

If φ is an *atom* (i.e. φ has the form $P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$)

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \varphi$ iff $\langle \nu(t_1) [s], \dots, \nu(t_n) [s] \rangle \in \nu(P) [s]$

If φ e ψ are wffs

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models (\neg\varphi)$ iff

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \not\models \varphi$

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models (\varphi \wedge \psi)$ iff

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \varphi$ AND $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \psi$

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models (\varphi \vee \psi)$ iff

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \varphi$ OR $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \psi$

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$ iff

NOT $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \varphi$ OR $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \psi$

Quantified formulae

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \forall x \varphi$ iff

FORALL $\underline{d} \in \mathbf{U}$ we have $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s](x:\underline{d}) \models \varphi$

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \exists x \varphi$ iff

it EXISTS $\underline{d} \in \mathbf{U}$ such that $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s](x:\underline{d}) \models \varphi$

Where $[s](x:\underline{d})$ is the *variant* of function s that assigns \underline{d} to x and remains unaltered for any other variables.

Models

- **Validity** in a possible world, **model**

A wff φ such that $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s] \models \varphi$ for any *valuation* s is **valid** in $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$

$\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$ is also a **model** of φ

and we write $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle \models \varphi$ (i.e. the reference to s can be omitted)

A possible world $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$ is a **model** of a *set* of wff Γ iff it is a model for all the wffs in Γ

and we write $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle \models \Gamma$

- **Truth**

A **sentence** ψ is **true** in $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$ if it is **valid** in $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$

Validity in general

■ Validity and logical truth

A wff (either open or closed) is **valid** (also **logically valid**) if it is **valid** in any possible world $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$

Example:

$$(P(x) \vee \neg P(x))$$

A sentence ψ is a **logical truth** if it is **true** in any possible world $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$

we write then $\models \psi$ (i.e. no reference to $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle$)

Examples:

$$\forall x (P(x) \vee \neg P(x))$$

$$\forall x \forall y (G(x,y) \rightarrow (H(x,y) \rightarrow G(x,y)))$$

■ Inconsistence

A wff (either open or closed) is **inconsistent** if its not *satisfiable*

Example:

$$\forall x (P(x) \wedge \neg P(x))$$

Entailment

- Definition

Given a set of wffs Γ and one wff φ , we have

$$\Gamma \models \varphi$$

iff all the combinations $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s]$ satisfying Γ also satisfy φ

This definition embraces all possible combinations $\langle \mathbf{U}, \Sigma, \nu \rangle [s]$

The only thing that does not vary is the language Σ

In general, a direct calculus of entailment is impossible...

*Say it with function or predicates?

Semantically, functions and predicates are very similar to each other:
can we get rid of functions at all?

- Functions are *relations*

Hence they can be *represented* via predicates

For instance, the two sentences:

$$\forall x \forall y \forall z ((\varphi(x,y) \wedge \varphi(x,z)) \rightarrow (y = z))$$


$$\forall x \exists y \varphi(x,y)$$

say altogether that the meaning of $\varphi(..)$ (i.e. a relation $v(\varphi) \subseteq \mathbf{U}^2$)
is also a *function* $\mathbf{U} \rightarrow \mathbf{U}$

- But only functions can be nested in terms

Therefore, functions allow for a much greater expressive power
(*which will reflect into a much greater difficulty in calculus ...*)

*Many-sorted or nil? (just for computer scientists)



$green, colorOf(green), colorOf(colorOf(green)), colorOf(colorOf(colorOf(green)))$

All these terms are syntactically correct, although they do not make that much sense...

For practical applications, functions should be restricted to given *types* (i.e. *sort*)

The type should be made explicit for each function and predicate symbols (besides *arity*)

Convenience of *nil*

A particular constant: *nil*

which has the conventional interpretation of a *non-object*

This gives an alternative for otherwise meaningless definitions:

$(colorOf(a) = green) \wedge (colorOf(green) = nil)$

And for particular cases as well:

$Above(a,b) \wedge Above(b,c) \wedge Above(c,nil)$